This section offers succinct lessons on future international support for a just resolution of the conflicts that have affected areas of Myanmar over many decades. The findings are also relevant at the national level in Myanmar and to conflict mitigation in other countries. Overall, the impact of international peace support from 2010 to 2020 was multifaceted given the diversity of international engagement in Myanmar, the complex nature of the country’s conflicts, and the many factors at play.

The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of 2015 and other attempts to resolve conflict reduced levels of violence in some areas and built understanding of the steps needed to achieve sustainable peace. But expectations were ultimately not met as the peace process stalled and violence persisted even before the military takeover of 2021 abruptly ended Myanmar’s reform period. With hindsight, it is evident that donors made errors or miscalculations during this period, and they typically held unrealistic expectations over the pace and depth of change. Overall, however, the lack of common ground between conflict parties and the actions of key domestic actors were the main reasons leading to the NCA’s failure to reduce conflict, rather than weak or inappropriate foreign assistance.

While international diplomatic and foreign aid support for peacebuilding was significant, with over USD 500 million spent on peacebuilding between 2012 and 2020, it was a small fraction of overall aid to Myanmar and it alone was insufficient to shift the overall incentives of the Myanmar military or EAOs. The true impact of foreign peace support comes from the details of specific initiatives rather than the collective effect of financial transfers. The array of projects, programs, advice and technical support undoubtedly had major impacts in specific fields, and the legacies of many support initiatives are likely to persist as experiences and knowledge that can be brought to bear in future.

Enthusiasm over the reforms in Myanmar hindered recognition of ongoing, structural problems. The strong support for Myanmar’s political and economic reforms among Western and other democratic countries meant that major entrenched issues were overlooked. Myanmar became a global success story, seen as a rare foreign policy win for those promoting democracy. These conditions created incentives to back reforms and to present a positive story, yet the overall reform process did not fundamentally address the deep-rooted national-level challenges facing the country. Western aid officials and analysts were far more surprised by the military coup of February 2021 than many people from Myanmar, illustrating the persistent disconnect between development donors and military leadership.

Although many individuals and some agencies had a strong understanding of the peace process, donors often saw conflict in ethnic communities as an adjunct to a wider program of national reforms. This view was compounded by a like-minded echo chamber, resulting at times in trade-offs between national reforms and the peace process. For example, there was tension among Western embassies between the need to keep democratic reforms on track by holding elections in 2015 and the recognition that postponing them could have given the peace process a better chance of taking hold. Following the elections, strong foreign support for the new government led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and a perceived need to strengthen diplomatic relationships now that the country was seen as democratic, made it hard for donors to constructively criticize her flawed approach to the peace process. This dynamic also made it harder for donor representatives to respond to the positions of leaders of ethnic armed and civil organizations, as support for the central government directly opposed ethnic aspirations for greater regional autonomy.

Indeed, donors often failed to adequately consider the ‘problem statement’ of a given intervention. Did they really know which problem they were trying to target? Were their programs and funding approaches conducive to fixing the actual problem? Poorly defined strategies led to technical and depoliticized interventions that were unable to tackle the actual roots of the issue. For example, gender equality measures that fail to consider the roots of inequality in patriarchal systems are unlikely to succeed.

Western donors were overly optimistic about the NCA’s ability to deliver a peace agreement. Their programs remained heavily concentrated in southeastern areas of the country where the NCA had generated ground-level improvements. By contrast, the long history of ceasefires in Myanmar and deep mistrust of the military led most ethnic leaders and commentators to remain cautious in demonstrating their support for the NCA. In practice, many of Myanmar’s larger EAOs, as well as a range of Border Guard Forces and militia, were not involved in the NCA and the military pursued a different agenda in the northern regions and in Rakhine State.

Myanmar’s context of structural constraints, poorly aligned interests, and institutional barriers created massive challenges. Rather than generating momentum for peace, the transition to a more democratic government in 2015 added further complications as peace process mechanisms were changed or undermined. The military used the NCA as a tool for supporting its incremental efforts to ‘win by process’ rather than as a fundamental basis for a new direction, and civil oversight of the armed forces remained absent.

Finally, Western donors involved in peacebuilding did not take regional powers sufficiently into account. While key foreign support for the NCA came from Western countries along with Japan, China played a dominant role in engagement with northern EAOs as well as maintaining closer relations with the military. The strong support offered by Western countries led to concerns in the Chinese government that it would threaten their own position. Other neighbors of Myanmar including India and Thailand were also only marginally involved in the peace process. Looking ahead, regional powers and Myanmar’s neighbors are likely to be increasingly significant influences on conflict resolution.

Considering these major contextual challenges facing peace efforts in Myanmar at the time, several major points emerge from the research:

The national approach to peacebuilding had major limitations which foreign donors could have better anticipated. While a single agreement may have been a necessary part of the NCA’s ability to garner broad support, the different contexts of Myanmar’s conflicts and the diversity of actors required a more multifaceted approach. The challenges are so thorny—they are such ‘wicked problems’—that a more nuanced and varied approach is probably needed. Ethnic leaders preferred to see greater recognition of diversity across Myanmar, recognizing that one size does not fit all and acknowledging the parallel governance systems present in some areas. Foreign support to dialogue and debate around future governance scenarios could have enabled greater inclusion of diversity and engagement from below in more effective ways.

Some donor programs were effective but others were not fit for purpose. Decision-making around program approaches, potential partnerships, and methods of engagement was not consistently based on strong contextual knowledge or representative consultation. As many foreign actors scaled up support and transitioned toward centralized delivery mechanisms, aid impacts were constrained by prescriptive and at times superficial goals, externally designed interventions, weak evidence and an over-reliance on foreign consultants, and a failure to match results with the need on the ground. Narrow, identifiable goals may help to demonstrate accountability, but they limit effectiveness unless adapted to fit the context of a fluctuating peace process. These constraints affected support for gender inclusion and equality as bold objectives in this field were reduced to superficial project outcomes such as quotas for female participants in meetings.

Development engagement in areas actively affected by conflict requires extra caution and foreign actors can usefully draw on established best practice to identify risks and devise appropriate solutions. Though many areas of Myanmar had seen significant reductions in violence and instability, the post-conflict mentalities adopted by many donors limited the scope to adapt programming, particularly as they sought to strengthen relations with the central state following the 2015 elections. Closing field offices, downgrading ties with cross-border organizations, and failure to consult comprehensively limited the understanding of governance and development realities in contested areas among national and international programming staff.

In rapidly changing contexts, maintaining flexibility and managing risk can enable more effective support. Local partners often faced huge management burdens to comply with donor requirements, and constructive partnerships were limited by the lack of downward accountability (donors and intermediaries principally answer to their own governments rather than the aid recipients). By offering a wider range of mechanisms suited to a complex political environment, and adopting flexible tools for different approaches, donors can offer more options and opportunities to local partners. Flexible funding mechanisms are critical for supporting key elements of fast-changing and varied peace processes. A willingness to accept some risk of failure and to navigate complex “political risks” or reputational damage rather than playing it safe also assists effective programming. Pooled funds that combine donor support can help to spread risks and deliver creative support including providing core support to smaller organizations or civic networks, such as feminist and women’s rights groups. In Myanmar they were also associated with cumbersome procedures, long delays, and an inability to respond to changing circumstances as the national level peace process lost momentum.

Overcoming the deep roots of conflict requires contextually based, long-term and politically engaged support. The asymmetric nature of Myanmar’s subnational conflicts challenges common donor approaches. Aid programs, including peace support, are typically agreed through diplomatic or working relationships between the donor and the recipient government. This is a major constraint when the recipient government is a conflict actor. In Myanmar, some EAO leaders felt that foreign aid exacerbated existing power asymmetries by backing state institutions without sufficient balance. Trust gaps between opposing groups, as well as between powerholders and the wider population, constrain the ability of any agreement to take hold. Foreign actors can address some of the constraints through politically astute programming and by supporting measures to build confidence or incrementally improve relationships.

Recommendations for International Development Agencies

These proposed measures are intended primarily for foreign aid providers and their partners seeking to support future peace efforts in Myanmar. The authors emphasize that these recommendations should inform interventions at an appropriate time in the future, recognizing that democratic leaders rejected dialogue with the country’s military leaders following the military takeover of February 2021. Future peace initiatives will likely look very different from those tried in the past. However, even in a different context, lessons from the past remain important.

1. Take a long-term view and check expectations

  • Recognize the constraints limiting rapid impacts of external support for peacebuilding and the risks of expecting progress prematurely. Be aware that domestic political changes and tensions, including elections, can undermine arrangements and trust in the absence of a broad consensus.
  • Signaling rapid progression to a post-conflict situation can risk undermining fragile peace processes. Distinguish between a ceasefire agreement that aims to diminish violence and more comprehensive long-term steps. Donors should be prepared for uneven and unpredictable pathways towards peace.
  • Peace processes in Myanmar need to address hugely varied conditions and interests. A national approach needs to enable locally defined responses, and it is likely that devolved approaches will be more effective.
  • Incremental measures such as piloting development initiatives and shared monitoring or boundary commissions can be established to usefully generate momentum, build confidence, and maintain progress. Careful review of evidence on such initiatives will help to avoid repeating past mistakes.

2. Support trust-building and public confidence measures as soon as conditions allow

  • Start early by supporting domestic capacities in conflict resolution, dialogue and consultation with government, ethnic organizations and civil society.
  • In the event of progress towards a ceasefire, support initiatives focused on building trust and confidence, drawing on the experience of efforts undertaken in the run-up to the NCA.
  • Support or encourage public opinion and public information programs. Despite low interest from conflict actors, government officials, and some donors in the past, building public understanding of and support for peace processes remains important and under-appreciated, both in conflict-affected areas and across the country.
  • Invest in understanding the varied positions and perspectives of leaders within armed groups, and use the information to generate tailored and appropriate incentives for change. This may require finding and supporting trusted intermediaries or brokers able to bridge divides.

3. Enable mutual understanding and respond to conflicting interests of different actors

  • Support collaboration between democratic leaders and ethnic leaders through formal platforms or informal spaces to avoid past fault-lines and grievances.
  • Treat all conflict parties with equally high levels of respect. Non-state actors cannot always be offered full equivalence with states but their challenges need to be understood and their positions acknowledged.

4. Think more about how to work with neighboring countries

  • Seek fields of common ground in supporting reconciliation with Myanmar’s neighboring governments and regional powers including China, India, and Thailand. Consider entry points including tackling border-related concerns such as human trafficking, drugs, and transnational crime as well as cross-border humanitarian support.
  • Consider closer engagement with ASEAN, including individual ASEAN member countries and the ASEAN Office of the Special Envoy, to maximize the impact of diplomatic engagement and ensure consistent messaging around agreed points such as humanitarian access.
  • Seek incremental steps or specific opportunities to build wider international engagement such as external monitoring or advisory bodies.

5. Adapt national approaches

  • Support inclusive political processes for reforms, especially plans for devolving authority or federalism. Ensure the representation of ethnic leaders at the national level and subnationally, and ensure that proposed reforms reflect the aspirations of ethnic communities.
  • Review the impact of past national programs in conflict-affected areas and respond to findings. Doing so will avoid extending the negative track record of development such as new infrastructure or education expansion in conflict-affected areas.
  • Consider how to engage appropriate partners for program delivery in ethnic areas without repeatedly defaulting to central government institutions or ethnic majority actors. Include groups that are relatively far from traditional centers of power such as religious, gender or sexual minorities.
  • Find entry points to support reconciliation and longer-term social change through indirect approaches in sectors such as women’s empowerment, education, and accountable governance. Be willing to work with groups that are not formally registered with the central government.

6. Ensure understanding of Myanmar’s diversity

  • Ensure staff diversity within aid agencies, projects and programs. Research findings show that the inclusion of staff from underrepresented communities and locations improves effectiveness in conflict-affected and minority areas.
  • Encourage and support staff to recognize and respond to prejudice. Consider overall mission statements or guidance to reduce discriminatory attitudes. Implement appropriate recruitment practices to promote diversity and seek to support the capacity of staff or potential staff members from minority backgrounds.
  • Consider supporting national level public education campaigns to address prejudice and build mutual understanding alongside reforms or peace processes. Investing in public buy-in for reconciliation and conflict resolution is key to the sustainability of any future peace agreement.

7. Deliver programming on Women, Peace, and Security that recognizes gendered power and inequality as a driver of violence

  • Ensure that assessments including political economy and conflict analysis reflect gender among other considerations of power dynamics. Since the military takeover, shifting conceptions of masculinity provide opportunities to foster alternative conceptions of gender identities in Myanmar, including understanding men’s roles in and experiences of gender-based violence.
  • Structure WPS funding streams to fit the needs and characteristics of key actors involved in existing efforts. Funds must be flexible (to ensure that emerging opportunities can be grasped and momentum can be capitalized on), direct (local actors should be primary recipients where possible, based on appropriate administrative requirements) and core (to enable institutional and longer-term growth).
  • Ensure that engagement on WPS is collaborative, coordinated, and strategic to avoid duplication or overburdening local actors. Quality engagement based on nuance and sensitivity is needed to avoid performative or superficial approaches, while widening reach beyond the pool of known and established actors.
  • Generating and sharing evidence to learn from what has and has not worked is needed to support improvements in future funding decisions and strategic investment in WPS, with donors ensuring that resources and expertise are allocated to monitoring and evaluation of programs.

8. Carefully consider multi-donor pooled funds and coordination

  • Large multi-donor funds are not suited to rapidly changing contexts or emerging reform processes which require greater flexibility. Donors must be willing to tolerate political risks and adapt approaches as needed.
  • Given that realistic coordination mechanisms are required to minimize duplication and to maximize effectiveness, consider other ways to share knowledge or resources and allocate funds accordingly while maintaining necessary flexibility:
    • Thematic or issue-specific coordination involving smaller groups of donors with agreed levels of risk tolerance
    • Selection of a lead agency for specific sectors, fields, or subnational areas, potentially with discretion over pooled resources
    • Commitment to using improved systems for sharing information and informal coordination spaces

9. Build on what works and adapt approaches

  • Base programs on evidence of what is effective including past evaluations from Myanmar, and be willing to back pilot programs as learning initiatives.
  • Plan for longer inception periods and programs that have longer, multi-year timeframes. Incentivize reporting of failure and subsequent adaptation based on learning. Where possible, ensure that evaluation and learning resources are shared publicly to support other international interventions and demonstrate downstream accountability to local communities.
  • In addition to high-level consultation and analysis, tools such as project safeguarding principles, guidelines, and reviewing processes can support informed approaches.
  • Allow sufficient time and budget for in-depth consultation. Engage well-informed partners close to the ground when designing approaches. If it is not possible to take these steps, it is often better to postpone engagement.
  • Support independent, locally driven research and analysis – particularly to inform broader potential programming. In cases, international research agencies or academic institutions can collaborate with national or local organizations. Enable local communities to participate in research, analysis, and evaluation.

10. Avoid a ‘gold rush’ of foreign aid

  • Start small and build gradually to avoid the rush of competing international agencies and the associated administrative burden that is imposed on national partners.
  • Focus on priority areas or sectors, especially those that are receiving less international assistance. Consider gap analyses to identify where the greatest need lies and avoid clustering around the most accessible conflict-affected areas or where existing ties have been strongest.
  • Support partner capacity and quality assurance, including the institutional development of smaller or emerging organizations. Vital core funding can often be integrated into program budgets.
  • While donor agencies often need to work through contracted agencies or grant recipients, avoid long chains of intermediaries and incentivize intermediaries to build on locally devised approaches.

11. Support flexible responses

  • Back programming that can adapt to shifting circumstances and avoids the straitjacket of rigid project management. Specialist channels for rapid peace support (such as the US government’s Office of Transition Initiatives) can reduce delays and administrative burdens on recipients through modalities such as fixed contract grants with programmatic milestones rather than itemized budgets.
  • Pilot novel funding mechanisms that avoid donor-driven approaches. For example, innovation funds can respond to proposals from national organizations in broadly defined fields such as Women, Peace and Security. National advisors can participate alongside donors in fund governance structures, playing a key role in defining guidelines and in enabling adaptation over time in response to changed circumstances or new evidence.
  • Implement alternative accountability procedures that offer reassurance without becoming constrictive. Promote downward accountability and transparency, especially for intermediary NGOs or institutions that provide funds to local organizations or communities yet remain answerable only to donor agencies.